Arakan's Border Conflict: Junta-Backed Armed Groups and the Bangladesh Factor

By Admin 05 Nov 2026

DMG Editorial

The resurgence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) along the Bangladesh–Arakan border, as fighting intensifies around Sittwe, is more than a coincidental development. It reflects a longstanding security challenge involving Myanmar's military, Muslim armed organisations and competing interests along the frontier.

During the 2024 battles for Buthidaung and Maungdaw, Myanmar's military cooperated with Muslim armed groups, including ARSA and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), despite its history of persecuting Muslim civilians. Independent research documented military training, ammunition supplies and tactical assistance, while subsequent investigations identified continuing links between these groups and junta personnel.

This history is essential to understanding renewed attacks against Arakan Army (AA) positions.

For Myanmar's military, maintaining relationships with armed groups along the northern Arakan border offers a means of pressuring the AA after losing territorial control. Ambushes, cross-border incursions and attacks on security outposts can divert AA personnel and resources from major battlefronts, particularly Sittwe.

ARSA, RSO and the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) have been linked to attacks and armed activities along the border. However, these organisations have different leadership structures and objectives. Their past cooperation with the junta does not establish that every recent attack was directly coordinated by Myanmar's military.

The Bangladesh dimension further complicates the conflict.

The AA has accused certain Bangladeshi border security personnel of providing armed groups with logistical assistance, ammunition and intelligence. Such allegations require credible investigation and must be distinguished from Bangladesh's official government policy. Border Guard Bangladesh has publicly denied supporting ARSA or RSO.

Bangladesh faces legitimate challenges involving border security, refugee protection and the eventual repatriation of Muslim/Rohingya refugees. Any involvement by individual security officials in facilitating cross-border armed operations would undermine those objectives and increase regional instability.

The motivations behind Muslim armed-group activities are also complex. Alongside reported military cooperation, longstanding grievances, disputes over political representation and territorial control, and frustration over the prolonged refugee crisis have contributed to recruitment and armed mobilisation.

These factors cannot justify attacks on civilians, forced recruitment or other abuses.

For residents of Maungdaw, the consequences are immediate. Armed violence, insecurity and restricted movement threaten livelihoods and safety, particularly in vulnerable border communities. Muslim refugees also face intimidation, coercive recruitment and violence by armed organisations.

Crucially, the actions of ARSA, RSO or ARA must not be attributed collectively to Muslim civilians. Equally, allegations of abuses against Muslim communities by other armed actors require independent investigation and accountability.

The AA's territorial gains bring responsibilities extending beyond military security. Effective governance requires protecting all communities, addressing grievances and preventing ethnic divisions from deepening.

Arakan's border crisis cannot be resolved through military operations alone. It demands scrutiny of junta-linked armed networks, credible investigation of alleged cross-border assistance, responsible engagement with Bangladesh and equal protection for civilians.

Without addressing the political grievances and armed networks sustaining violence, territorial control will remain an uncertain foundation for lasting peace in Arakan.