Arakan State has 17 townships. The Arakan Army (AA) controls 14 of them. As a result, the military regime was able to conduct elections in only three townships, Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung and even there, voting was incomplete in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu.

In 2025, junta airstrikes fundamentally reshaped the conflict landscape in Arakan (Rakhine State). More than a battlefield tactic, aerial attacks became a central instrument of political control used to compensate for shrinking ground authority, disrupt civilian life, and silence independent information flows.

A former 88 Generation Arakan student leader concluded: “2026 will be a year of momentum toward the complete removal of the junta from Arakan. For the ULA/AA, it will be a decisive year not only of territorial control, but of emerging as a sovereign authority capable of international engagement and economic governance.”

The year 2025 did not deliver a decisive military breakthrough in Arakan (Rakhine) State, but it fundamentally reshaped the conflict's character. What emerged was a landscape defined less by rapid battlefield advances and more by territorial consolidation, prolonged sieges, junta airpower dominance, and a deepening humanitarian and governance crisis.

This anniversary arrives at one of the most dangerous and precarious moments in DMG's history. Across Arakan (Rakhine) State, sustained armed conflict, relentless airstrikes, mass displacement, and prolonged communication blackouts have transformed journalism into a high-risk act of public service.

The year 2025 was not a good one for the people of Arakan (Rakhine) State in western Myanmar. Across nearly every sector, economic, social, and humanitarian, residents endured some of the heaviest psychological and physical impacts in recent years.

The relationship between the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) and Bangladesh's interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has become more complex and more strategic than a simple story of "tension versus cooperation.

His fortunes shifted dramatically in 1988, when his former mentor, U Ko Lay, became mayor of Yangon after the military coup. With U Ko Lay’s patronage, he secured a series of lucrative contracts for municipal markets, bridges, and infrastructure projects across Yangon.

The interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus is now under extraordinary strain. The administration has offered a reward of 5 million Bangladeshi taka for information leading to the arrest of the shooter.

What defines the current phase of violence is not only the rising tempo of attacks but their expanding geographic sweep. Although Myanmar’s conflict has long included aerial strikes, recent weeks reveal a new pattern:

The release of DMG's Landmine Impact Report covering Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, and Ponnagyun townships provides one of the clearest windows yet into the hidden war unfolding beneath Arakan's soil. 

In parallel, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) controls most of Arakan State and nearly the entire 270-km land border with Bangladesh while fighting junta forces on multiple fronts. The result is a sharpening border contest across the Naf River and the Mayu range-featuring cross-border raids, ambushes, abductions, maritime run-ins, and information warfare-that is eroding the prerequisites for voluntary, safe, and dignified return.

Although the month of November has yet to fully embody the chill of the winter season, the northern winds have already begun to usher in the cold months. In the same way, the Arakan Army (AA) ushered in a new era for Arakan (Rakhine) State on November 13, 2023.

Had the houses been destroyed by crossfire, one might find resignation. But there was no ongoing fighting in town at that point. The vandalism and arson by militant elements and junta affiliates—different paths, same aim—are not things one forgets. Many families shared the same fate as Yai Phyu’s.
 

Anchoring on AA "accountability" as a precondition has, in effect, overlooked AA-led social-cohesion efforts visible on the ground. Combined with media omissions on ARSA/RSO dynamics, the exchange failed to point toward the relationship-building and trust-building that repatriation will require.

For centuries, the story of Arakan has been told by others - by conquerors, colonial officers, and central rulers who saw our land as a periphery and our people as subjects. But the true story of Arakan (Rakhine) is not one of rebellion or violence; it is a story of endurance. It is the story of a people who have suffered in silence and still found the strength to rise, to organize, and to dream again.

This article will also cover topics such as electoral laws, misunderstandings, the net political gains the military regime will accrue from them, and how party politicians factor in the results.

The current situation highlights a paradox. The ULA/AA is advancing a political project that seeks to redefine Arakan as a multi-ethnic, inclusive homeland where Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and other communities share equal rights. Yet this project is being tested by border militarisation, insurgent violence, and cross-border political agendas.

The Arakan Army, which has declared that Arakan State should be a junta-free zone, is facing pressure from outside powers in the ongoing battles in Kyaukphyu and Sittwe.